

a body in its diluted contours. In Portuguese, *informe* refers to formless as well as to the act of giving information, being an adjective, a substantive and a verb in both its present (singular first and third persons of a particular present tense) and imperative forms – for Bataille it is that which strives to evade classification

The force of paradoxes is that they are not contradictory; they rather allow us to be present at the genesis of the contradiction. (...) In the singularity of paradoxes, nothing begins or ends, everything proceeds at once in the direction of both past and future. (...) There is nothing astonishing in the fact that the paradox is the force of the unconscious (...) Gilles Deleuze

Paradox is initially that which destroys good sense as the only direction, but it is also that which destroys common sense as the assignation of fixed identities. Gilles Deleuze

in + habit, in tension with the unknown aspect entailed in anything that might be beyond representation or in any attempt of getting there

informeorientrembling by Gabriela Tarcha — Dance Unlimited Arnhem, ArtEZ — May 2010 — **on überhaupt how to wards inhabit**, or an embodied attending to, a presence? **in**

side out **the context of performance** where does it start and end?, **the forces** logics contexts intensities modes states tensions nuances chaos(es) transitions tastes

Only the present exists in time and gathers together or absorbs the past and the future. But only the past and the future inhere in time and divide each present infinitely. Gilles Deleuze

of (our) whose? each one's and ours **time that can lead** or take, move, enter, navigate, **one** multip(l)ies **beyond** so is it afterwards? does it mean transcendent?

logics a logic is a metalanguage, the operating mode of something, logics (that allow the emergence) of paradoxes, logics of preemption, logics of impermanence,

interpenetration and affect — as connectedness or involvement with the world —, logics of movement, logics of life, logics of difference, logics of peripeteia **of off representation** mediation ?

If cruel, it does not invite us to die in ravishment, art at least has the virtue of putting a moment of our happiness on a plane equal to death. Georges Bataille

This is painting as representational, as always already 'thought out', predetermined before it is even begun. Simon O'Sullivan

It is by following the border, by skirting the surface, that one passes from bodies to the incorporeal. Gilles Deleuze,

Actually existing, structured things live in and through that which escapes them. Brian Massumi

Quotes at the front page, starting on the centre left, anti-clock wise:

(Deleuze: 1969, 5)

(<http://www.laramartelli.de/>)

Massumi quoted in Thrift (Thrift: 2008, 117)

(Deleuze: 1969, 9)

(O'Sullivan, 2007, 132)

(Deleuze: 1969, 3)

(Deleuze: 1969, 74-80)

(Bataille's definition of informe: <http://daisenbergspace.live.com/blog/cnst!E24F43A0A268CCD!1829.entry>)

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Language consists of a vast array of strategies and situations for discovering and making meaning. It not only exists in multitudes of contexts, it is multitudes of context. Lyn Hejinian

Some call it 'prose', others 'poetry' and 'drama'. It is not closed and final meaning. Lyn Hejinian

de-finition: from de- 'completely'
+ finire 'to bound, limit'.

However, if limit is understood as open, in the Massumian

Let me know when we get there, if we get there. (...) Nothing is ever finished. Fink's album Sort of revolution infinitely approaches but never reaches'; the de-finition of

definition becomes wide open.

Do we then get to a blur?
(Massumi, 2002: 116)

(How to keep thinking through a series of sentences followed by a question mark?)

improvisation as the ruler, endless approximation: composing a void paradoxical parody |
The writer relinquishes total control and challenges authority as a principle and control as a motive.¹ Lyn Hejinian

perception not imposed. question of economy of authorship. rest(lessness) as the motor for

But the relation to the possible is that of (in)decision. Jean-Luc Nancy

Why a predominance of value systems based on connectivity rather than disconnectivity? How to write about ambiguity, exhaustion, indiscernibility and the unpredictability of becoming without betraying those ideas themselves?

In which discursive context(s) can one still keep the flow of the gut level interacting with the articulations of speech? How to keep the grid — and the grid of the grid of the grid... — in movement? How to ensure or allow nonbinary mechanisms to survive and manifest in a binary dominated world? Where does one arrive by attempting to exhaust language, meaning, subjectivity, representation? What would be pre-representational — all that has to do with indicating the potential, such as for instance a declaration of intentions? Isn't it astounding that so often and mostly almost imperceptibly devaluation is used as a domination strategy? What kinds of time occur to different bodies? In which case(s) does it make sense to look through the lens of the notion of movement vocabulary? At what point does recognition become reflection? How to stay in a state of peripeteia? What are the fluid signifiers that make up the production of subjectivity?

When we feel, we feel the emergency: when we feel the emergency, we will act: when we act, we will change the world. Julian Beck, Living Theatre

Let us wage a war on totality; let us be witnesses to the unrepresentable; let us activate the differences and save the honor of the name. (Lyotard, 1979: 82)

¹ (Hejinian, 2000: 43)

circumstances of production: encounter of force fields; things that have no signification and yet have a sense — a region of clarity, a field of exteriority; absurdity diverting from nonsense in

Un dictionnaire commercial à partir du moment où le sens mais les besoins des mots. Georges Sorel

contents

exhaustion

representation

art

field

and

to Cybele

This research emerged from particular experiences of exhaustion — as a methodology in theatre — and from sensing that the presence generated by that kind of process had not much — if maybe nothing — to do with representation any longer. This perception made me think that a possible *beyond* *logics of representation* might have to do with a specific appropriation or sense of time, or losing sense of it — this methodology implies a long span of hours of intense and uninterrupted movement activity. Time and presence concern very basic levels of be(com)ing in the world. Indeed, one has the feeling that this methodology of *exhaustion work* affects one's ground: literally energy streams into and through channels not usually perceived or experienced and so there seems to occur a cleaning and opening of the body-mind, (re-)charging it. The result is a particular embodiment that centres one on a level of instinct and intuition, one's reflexes are sharpened and one's senses are awakened. I think an accurate description of this state can be found in Massumi's words, as he analyses the work of the artist Stelarc in *Parables for the Virtual: movement, affect, sensation: the body is opening itself to qualitative change, a modification of its very definition, by reopening its relation to things*². As these mo(ve)ments provoke the unsealing of multiple underlying relational principles and forces in the body, one's presence becomes dilated and accelerated — this is an unerring investment on a-signifying potentials and affective realms. Noticing these thresholds, I persist in my decision of experimenting with exhaustion.

At the other end of the spectrum of exhaustion, one finds a use of reduction of means that can reverse into expansion. Openness is then a key point of this enhanced present-ness, an openness that eventually also emerges with concentration. This is a principle of abstraction, which uses condensation or abbreviation of means to generate sense, leaving space for thought to be completed by others — like mapping.

² (Massumi, 2002: 116)
I (<http://www.alexalienart.com/bacon%20bled%20bare.htm>)
II (Nancy, 1993: 87)
III (Nancy, 1993: 140)

I make use of *marginalia* in a couple of ways: to anchor and help to clarify what is being developed in the main body of the text and as well as to create openings, hints of directions that might be pursued, in case of further interest.

even if that might be triggered by a seemingly contradictory strategy of spreading and spending energy

With this concept we are encouraged to question the integrity of signification. By breaching the threshold of signification there results a momentary loss of the senses, at which point we might take the opportunity to search out or invent other modes of making sense. Helene Frichot ¹

de-cision, cutting separation or opening separation. In other words, decision and disclosedness are linked from the start in an essential way ¹¹ and then *For the incompleteness of relation is relation itself. (...) Relation resists, insists and inscribes itself as separation ¹¹¹*
Nancy tells us — I bow.

Thinking of openness in terms of the very impossibility of relations to be complete invites for an ongoing creative approach. To return to the realm of flesh and to push further the plunge into scarcity (of means) that produces an excess one could think of experiments such as fasting, which have an equivalent outcome to the one of processes of exhaustion as accounted for here. Even in very few days the changes it triggers in one's presence and body are with no doubt noticeable. Confrontation with an essential level of *necessity* is the key to shifting gear into the operational mode of exhausted enhanced present-ness of body-mind. This is a state that loudly and lively utters a (making) sense, which is born from the bodily senses awakened by altered perception — in this refreshed perception resides a *difference*. This is a domain of sensation.

An excess of presence is triggered — one might call that monstrous. Derrida presents a particular thinking on the dynamics of culture engaging with the monstrous; if I were to borrow his model, my position would be one of going for spending more effort in and augmenting confrontations with the monstrous, de-privileging its domestication — not a matter of disavowing any of the two, simply of balancing it. In Bergson's words, what is at stake is the *invincible tendency which impels us to think on all occasions of things rather than of movements*.³

These matters, so far briefly introduced, take us to a question posed by Dorothea Olkowski that can be taken as an alternative formulation of the restlessness inherent in this research: *is representation the only means available to us to make sense of the world*?⁴. However, before moving on, let's take a look into possible understandings of representation and of its logics.

yet other universes to be investigated are aspect(s) related to trance state(s) — towards disembodiment and (dis)possession.

there is an immediateness to it: *Sensation, which sets the form into motion, participates in the surging forth of all the differential elements of life despite the persistent proximity of death. Helene Frichot IV*

monstrous: a transformational potential that moves away from normality — unknown, unexpected, uncontrollable, unusual, unbearable, uncertain.

The unconscious affect, which not only penetrates the mind but literally opens it, is the stranger in the house, always forgotten, and whose mind must even forget its forgetting in order to be able to pose as master of itself. Jacques Rancière V

What we are suggesting, in effect, is that there is a special relation between painting and hysteria. It is very simple. Painting directly attempts to release the presences beneath representation, beyond representation.

Gilles Deleuze VI

³ (Bergson, 1991: 121)

IV (<http://www.alexalienart.com/bacon%20bled%20bare.htm>)

V (Rancière, 2007 : 131)

VI (Deleuze, 1981: 51-52)

⁴ (Olkowski, 1999: 133)

Olkowski writes about representation as the dissociation of *movement from the whole that moves*⁵ and as a realm of primacy of identity — she finds in the establishment of a fixed standard as norm or model the operating mode of the system of representation. The widely spread Aristotelian model of representation organized around identity, opposition, analogy and resemblance and Foucault's acknowledgement that it is precisely *good sense that reigns*

in the *philosophy of representation*⁶ are some of the further references she presents. In her book *Gilles Deleuze and the ruin of representation* one finds on the other extreme what Luce Irigaray proposes as a *logic of relation* and the Bergsonian method of intuition, which is connected to instinct — intuition, happening at once, can not be represented.

A dissociation of movement from the whole that moves can be functional depending on how it takes place — to create a distance and allow for another reading of things, for instance — but it can also generate a movement *in false*. A *loop* is implicit in re-presentation, some thing at a point is analogously related to another thing at another point — so both formulations, the gap created by the dissociation of movement as well as the identity principle, involve a sense of *similarity in distance*, a distance that implies one has arrived at another context. Going out of a primacy of identity and so of a tyranny of tolerance of differences, one heads towards multiplicity and arrives at *difference in itself*. This is a realm in which one would be better off thinking in terms of equivalences, that is, defined by approximations and not identities.

Hanna Pitkin, a political theorist, offers in *The concept of representation* a thorough analytical account of representation aiming at grabbing on its political core. Elaborating questions that revolve around themes of ownership of actions — who owns an action taken by a representative?, how to distinguish

Une chose nommée est une
chose morte, et elle est
mort parce qu' elle est
séparée.
Antonin Artaud ^{vii}

Difference is the state in which one can speak of determination as such. The difference 'between' two things is only empirical, and the corresponding determinations are only extrinsic. However, instead of something distinguished from something else, imagine something which distinguishes itself — and yet that from which it distinguishes itself does not distinguish itself from it. (...) It is as if the ground rose to the surface, without ceasing to be ground. There is cruelty, even monstrosity, on both sides of this struggle against an elusive adversary, in which the distinguished opposes something which cannot distinguish itself from it but continues to espouse that which divorces it. Difference is this state in which determination takes the form of unilateral distinction. We must therefore say that difference is made, or makes itself, as in the expression 'make the difference'. This difference or determination as such is also cruelty. Gilles Deleuze ^{viii}

Olkowski reports on Irigaray's search for an 'improper' language that expresses multiplicity and fluidity (...) fluidity is what is real. ^{ix}

⁵ (Olkowski, 1999: 132)

⁶ (Olkowski, 1999: 22)

VII (Greiner, 2005: 36)

VIII (Deleuze, 1968: 28)

IX (Olkowski, 1999: 63)

between a representative and an agent? — and presence — how present is something that is actually not present? —, she formulates two modes of representation: as *acting for* (*vertreten*, in German), which raises questions of *authorization* and *accountability*, and as *standing for* (*darstellen*). The latter one she divides in two distinct variants: a *descriptive* representation — that is, *the making present of something by resemblance or reflection*⁷ — and a *symbolic* one — which establishes another sort of connection to what is represented.

There she starts off with what Thomas Hobbes presents in *Leviathan*: the issue of *authorization* is an important one for him, it entails rights and responsibilities and he suggests that every act is one of representation — of oneself if not of someone else. This approach is taken by the author to be valid — though not all cases of authorization imply that someone will be represented by someone else — but still omitting much of what representation is. Diametrically opposed to the *authorization theorists*, for whom in a way the representative becomes disconnected or exempt of his own actions in face of the duty and responsibility of taking actions for the one(s) s/he represents, one finds the *accountability theorists* who promote that the representative is responsible to the represented — so, in A representing B, A is *answerable to B for what he says and does*⁸ —, only acknowledging the occurrence of representational processes when those controls of accountability to the represented take place. Unsatisfied, Pitkin concludes that these are two formal contractual relationships *where the one group defines a representative as someone who has been elected (authorized), the other defines him as someone who will be subject to election (held to account). Where the one sees representation as initiated in a certain way, the other sees it as terminated in a certain way. Neither can tell us anything about what goes on during representation, how a representative ought to act or what he is expected to do, how to tell if he has represented well or*

Representation is a kind of black box shaped by the initial giving of authority, within which the representative can do whatever he pleases. If he leaves the box, if he exceeds the limits, he no longer represents. There can be no such thing as representing well or badly; either he represents or he does not. There is no such thing as the activity of representing or the duties of a representative; anything done after the right kind of authorization and within its limits is, by definition, representing.
Hanna Pitkin x

Immersed in the authority of representation, we have perhaps abdicated the recuperation of creation.
Darthea Olkowski x

⁷ (Pitkin, 1967: 11)

x (Pitkin, 1967: 39)

⁸ Carl Friedrich quoted in Pitkin (Pitkin, 1967: 55)

XI (Olkowski, 1999: 167)

badly. Such questions do not even make sense in terms of formalistic definitions like the authorization and accountability views⁹. For Pitkin, representation is an activity — *an activity rather than a relationship between two terms*¹⁰ — that has to allow for judgment on its *content*, on the decisions and actions that happen inside its frame, and for the represented to recognize him or herself on what happened and on how it was done — being implied, in all of it, that a representative must be capable of effective action.

Considering that the point is to be able to draw unmistakable conclusions from A about B, the correspondence or accuracy of reflection present in this understanding of a representative *acting for* connects with the one kind of representative *standing for*, namely *descriptive* representation — and in here no action is at stake, what matters is what one *is* or *is like*, *being* rather than *doing*. She states that in art it is not how accurate a depiction is that marks

representational art but simply the evidence of the intention to de-pict. Within these parameters, not having relevant characteristics to (be) display(ed) makes representation impossible — an active principle comes about in the decision-making of which elements are (politically) relevant to be put forth.

Lisa Disch announces that by developing a critique of representational *standing for* as Pitkin acknowledges that there is no room for creativity and initiative to take place within *descriptive* representation, which is centered on passing information, *Pitkin effects a decisive break with "mirror" theories of representation, which is one significant step away from referentiality*¹¹.

In a political context, *symbolic* representation, in its turn, establishes itself as an *activity*, existing in the effecting of an identification or an alignment of wills between representative and represented. In this way, it involves the question of how each of those parts (can) influence(s) the other; soon we get

A representation is never a replica. The forms of art, ancient and modern, are not duplications of what the artist has in mind anymore than they are duplications of what he sees in the outer world. In both cases they are renderings within an acquired medium, a medium grown up through tradition and skill – that of the artist and that of the beholder. Hanna Pitkin ²⁰

In her critical accountancy entitled *Representation's 'Do's and Don'ts'*: Hanna Pitkin's *The Concept of Representation*, Lisa Disch takes Pitkin's book to challenge orthodoxies and build a critique of referentiality, tending to be radical in its approach but finally reining in at crucial moments. I take it as a source of references on political representation and prefer to rely on Rancière for thinking about aesthetics. (below)

⁹ (Pitkin, 1967: 58)
¹⁰ (www.univ-paris8.fr/scpo/lisadisich.pdf)
¹¹ (Pitkin, 1967: 66)
¹¹ (www.univ-paris8.fr/scpo/lisadisich.pdf)

introduced to a couple of potential dangers it might bring with itself: as it might call forth *the same irrational and affective elements produced by flags and hymns and marching bands*¹² that have no relation any longer with an alignment of wills, that is, in its extreme, it might become a fascist version of representation, as the represented might reflect the representative instead of influencing him or her — an *inverse representation*¹³. Here we fall off the realm of representation, since what takes life is an unilateral power relation that breaks the one premise brought about in the etymological innards of the word re-presentation, that *the represented must somehow be logically prior; the representative must be responsive to him rather than the other way around*¹⁴.

Pitkin insists on considering what happens *during* representation, the *substantive* component of representation, she searches for a way of acting that would embody in an equivalent way the correspondence that maps establish to what they represent; what concerns the concept of accuracy, Disch — in her turn — questions if this is a concept that should at all take part in a theory of representation. She concludes that in the core of Pitkin's thinking one finds two aspects: *equivalence* and *paradoxical requirement*. The first one means *a relative equivalence between the representative and the represented, so that the latter could conceivably have acted for himself instead*¹⁵. The *paradox requirement* entails *being represented means being made present in some sense, while not really being present literally or fully in fact*.¹⁶ Disch questions if this paradox is inherent in representation and resorts to Derrida, who set himself, in *Speech and Phenomena* written in 1967 as well, to put apart the idea that something has to exist *prior* to its representation: *on Derrida's account, representation does not re-present. Rather it participates in creating the allegedly independent entities for which it claims only to stand, and, by 'etymological' feint, reaffirms the*

In other words, what is the substance of the activity of representation and how does this activity differ from others in which one person is understood to act in the place of another?

Lisa Disch ^{xiii}

Power is the domestication of force. Force in its wild state arrives from outside to break constraints and open new vistas. Power builds walls.

Brian Massumi ^{xiv}

Pitkin suggests that to take representation seriously in its equivalence aspect is to pose a different question: How to institutionalize conditions for reciprocal agency?

Lisa Disch ^{xv}

elaborating on the different clear-cut and one-sided relations of one person acting for another that do not form an activity of representation — such as when one does not act for it but rather it acts by means of one —, Pitkin defines five categories: the *agent* or *actor* (acting); the *guardian* or *trustee* (taking care); the *deputy* or *attorney* (substitute); the *delegate* or *ambassador* (emissary); *specialist* (acting in interest of).

¹² (Pitkin, 1967: 106)

¹³ Ernest Barker quoted in Pitkin (Pitkin, 1967: 109)

¹⁴ (Pitkin, 1967: 140)

XIII (www.univ-paris8.fr/scpo/lisadisch.pdf)

XIV (Massumi, 1992: 6)

XV (www.univ-paris8.fr/scpo/lisadisch.pdf)

¹⁵ (Pitkin, 1967: 140)

¹⁶ (Pitkin, 1967: 153)

representation

dualistic ontology that lends credibility to the idea that they are independent. As Derrida puts it with characteristic elegance: 'the presence-of-the-present is derived from repetition and not the reverse'¹⁷.

Surprisingly in accordance with Derrida's ideas, Disch moves on to figure out that Pitkin conceives of a public representation — a mode of one-to-many, opposed to a private and conservative one-to-one representation — that is *intrinsically and inevitably transformative*¹⁸, since it allows a crowd to emerge from its diffuseness as it gathers around an interest or principle in such way that they become an entity they would not form otherwise, that is, without the process of representation — the collective body is not given *a priori* of the act of representation. It follows that the represented must be in a position of acting independently as well, not just being taken care of, and that there is a potential for conflict between represented and representative — at the same time, one of the tasks of political representation is precisely to attempt to sort out those conflicts. (...) *political representation produces the terms on which it is to be judged. (...) this reorientation casts representation as an activity of articulation: it does not refer to a prior unity but proposes ideals for the purpose of calling out constituencies and linking them together.*¹⁹ In public representation the representative process is not born from actions of any of its participants, but from the over-all arrangement and functioning of a system — in which public's interests responsiveness should be the ground and exceptions might be occasions in which non-responsiveness is justified in regard of those same interests. This is a *decentering* of representation that opens a potential for quite a radical impact — in Pitkin's world, however, it gets hold back by a retreat to thinking of and around responsiveness in a referential manner, premised on an etymological approach to re-presentation.

the notion of representation as *articulation* is an essential point: it brings emphasis to a sense of movement that finally ejects representation out of traditional static understandings of it, which – being caught in the realm of identity – are constantly threatened by negativity.
Movement – transformation – brings in a sense of monstrosity.

¹⁷ (www.univ-paris8.fr/scpo/lisadisch.pdf)

¹⁸ (www.univ-paris8.fr/scpo/lisadisch.pdf)

¹⁹ (www.univ-paris8.fr/scpo/lisadisch.pdf)

Taking flight in her own thinking and using a work by Bernard Manin as support, Disch clarifies that whenever the gap between represented and representative tends to disappear, one falls into a regime of absolute representation, in which there would be no room for dissent — preserving that distance is essential. She finds a formulation of representation that is striking in its elegance: *representation is ruling us in our own name. Representation is ruling, a hierarchal power relation. It is ruling 'us', a collectivity that recognizes itself as such, that imagines itself as somehow distinct. It is ruling us in 'our own name'.*

*What a peculiar locution – our own name. Not our given name but our own name, in other words, a name that is not simply ascribed or imputed to us but one with which we identify, to which we may or may not respond.*²⁰ She asserts that by speaking of in one's own name instead of on one's behalf opens the possibility of breaking with a referential understanding of representation and for closing the loophole of discretion²¹.

One notices how terms that imply appropriation, movement, difference and dissent slowly gain emphasis — I must admit my fascination with Disch's point and with how it evolves from the long critical examination of Pitkin's work; we follow now to aesthetic-political insets.

Jacques Rancière busies himself, in the last chapter of *The Future of the Image* named *Are some things unrepresentable?*, with sorting out the representative regime of art and representation in general. Writing on politics of aesthetics, he reminds us that representation is governed by sets of rules about what is and is not appropriate to be represented, so that the borders of regimes of the representable and unrepresentable float and re-shape as monsters get domesticated or familiar realms become de-territorialized in artistic endeavors. In any creative instance, once an equivalence between non-wanted and wanted actions surges, the separation between the universe of art and the universe of the ordinary dissolves. He points at art's fundamental paradox: the

Disch takes the words *ruling us in our own name* from a statement by John Dunn

Disch digs further into political representation, stating that the non-referentiality of representation brings with it the urgency to acknowledge that political representation creates then its own terms on which to be judged – that implies that there would be no point any longer in the apparent choice between preferences and interests and that the focus would be shifted to the processes of naming. This is a conception of political representation of ruling by naming. She extends that to a thinking of democracy, which would then live off a rich array of organization modes (mobilized *many*) and would be judged precisely by the vitality and diversity it generates.

²⁰ (www.univ-paris8.fr/scpo/lisadisch.pdf)

²¹ (www.univ-paris8.fr/scpo/lisadisch.pdf)

same gesture that posits its radical autonomy, its independence of any external rule, causes *the mimetic closure separating the rationale of fictions from that of facts, the sphere of representation from other spheres of existence*²² to be abolished.

Expatiating on the *withdrawal of artistic phenomena from the system of representation*²³, he mentions Lyotard's formula of *failing of the stable adjustment between the perceptible and the intelligible*²⁴, which indicates one has fallen out of the representative universe and that leads Rancière to the conclusion that the adjustment of exhibition and signification can then be regulated *ad infinitum*. In *The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible*, we find a historical account on aesthetic representation: Representation was *not resemblance as some appear to believe, but the existence of necessary connections between a type of subject matter and a form of expression*²⁵.

According to him, aesthetic representation generates constraints in three ways: by creating a dependency of the visible on speech, by adjusting the *relationship between what is understood or anticipated and what comes as a surprise, according to the paradoxical logic analysed by Aristotle's Poetics*²⁶ — ordering deployment of meanings —, which results in fostering a logic of gradual revelation and, finally, by forming in the movement of adjusting reality a dual accommodation — on one hand, ontological consistency and ethical exemplariness are relegated as fiction emerges, however on the other hand fictional entities are *beings of resemblance* whose actions are to be shared and appreciated. In the context of performance, how could it happen that, and what might happen when, the reassuring world of representation breaks down? I take that possible answers have rather to do with *how* than with *what*.

It is a boundary and passage between the enjoyment of suspension in fiction and the actual pleasure of recognition. And through this dual mechanism of distance and identification, it is also a boundary and passage between stage and auditorium. The relationship is not empirical. It is constitutive. The preferred site of representation is the theatre, a space of exhibition entirely given over to presence, but held by this very presence to a double restraint: the restraint of the visible under the sayable and of meanings and affects under the power of action - an action whose reality is identical to its unreality.
Jacques Rancière XVI

²² (Rancière, 2007: 123)

²³ (Rancière, 2007: 123)

²⁴ (Rancière, 2007: 123)

²⁵ (Rancière, 2000: 53)

²⁶ (Rancière, 2000: 114)

XVI (Rancière, 2007 :116)

Rancière's first point on the dependency of the visible on speech can be looked at in terms of how the body is approached wherever it appears: if submitted to all the hierarchies of rationality it will most likely fall into the restraints mentioned by him, however in instances in which its **presence** is allowed to be born in its own right, out of its inherent *necessities*, one can maybe perceive a move beyond those logics — here we are back to a conception of embodiment which has its affective potentials enhanced. Concerning a gradual logic of revelation: control over that can only be secured in works that keep the voices of an outside world at a reasonably safe distance — minimizing to the maximum any possible interference of chance in the development of the desired action; **chance**, in the strength and eventual violence with which it makes itself present, mostly can not be ignored and is usually rather difficult to be countered: if welcomed, the habits of a structure are brought to live *with and by a margin of deviation*²⁷ before it ends in disorder. The last point on *beings of resemblance* could as well possibly find a transmutation into another nature when works come into be(com)ing as *products of negotiation* with an audience, which entails another level of engagement.

Guy Debord in *The Society of the Spectacle*, takes representation to be the opposite of dialogue, which requires a heightened level of attention and puts a particular emphasis on the present mo(ve)ment — that is linked to functions of collaboration and participation — and Deleuze, in *Logic of Sense*, mentions that there is a certain use of representation without which it *would remain lifeless and senseless*²⁸ — only by enveloping the event at its borders it fulfills its potential. That implies a close encounter (with events), which suggests an approach to *beyond logics of representation* in the sense that representation might exceed its own frames — merging *with*; it becomes a matter of articulation. The notion of excess makes one think of Bataille, who

*For what is newly visible
has very specific
properties.
It does not make visible;
it imposes presence. But
this presence is itself
singular.
Jacques Rancière XVII*

*Feeling nothing
means not making enough effort.
Nicolas Bourriaud XVIII*

²⁷ (Massumi, 1992: 57)

²⁸ (Deleuze, 1969: 146)

XVII (Rancière, 2007 :121)

XVIII (Bourriaud, 1998: 80)

built his work on the critique of a *renunciation of existence in exchange for function*²⁹ and thought of art as a *mechanism for accessing a kind of immanent beyond to everyday experience; art operates as a kind of play which takes the participant out of a mundane consciousness*³⁰, into unknowns.

In the introduction to the first book of the Brazilian *Teatro da Vertigem*, Arthur Nastrovski states that the task of theatre resides in destroying representation to make visible what can not be represented, betraying its essence not to betray its sense — a *direct action upon the nervous system*³¹ is likely to assure such kind of movement taking place. Every time we notice the shared sensations that make us human there arises a sense. Martin

Nachbar makes a list of what people seek when going to theatres: *Death, ecstasy, concentration, becomings, bodies without organs, opposites coming together and, last not least, two friends on a quest for the impossible, reflecting on what they do at the same time as they go for it*.³²

Immanent to matter and to experience, *affect* is a crucial notion in this journey. Peter Pál Pelbart tells us that, stored between perception and action, *affect* is the gap or interstice that defines subjectivity in its temporal and spiritual senses. Massumi gives us some more clarification: *Affect is synaesthetic, implying a participation of the sense in each other (...) Affect is autonomous to the degree to which it escapes confinement in the particular body whose vitality, or potential for interaction, it is. Formed, qualified, situated perceptions and cognition's fulfilling functions of actual connection or blockage are the capture and closure of affect. Emotion is the interest's (most contracted) expression of that capture. – and of that fact that something has always and again escaped. Something remains unactualized, inseparable from but unassimilable to any particular, functionally anchored perspective. That is why all emotion is more or less disorienting, and why it is*

In rare instances, breakdown veers into breakaway, a line of escape back to the nonlimitative body without organs and the increasing potential residing there. That is called 'art' (whether or not a painting or a poem is ever produced). Brian Massumi xxx

*Logic tends to force similarities but that's not what we mean by 'sharing existence'.
Lyn Hejinian xx*

the online etymology dictionary states ex- 'out of' + peritus 'experienced, tested' — in Greek, peras means term, limit and peran, beyond.

Affect. Affection-Image: Affect is a neuronal response to external stimulus. Qualitative, not quantitative, it involves the body's power to absorb an external action and react internally. Affect is an intensive vibration, Deleuze's 'motor effort on an immobilized receptive plate', rather than an extensive sensory-motor act. Bergson and Deleuze compare affection-images to adjectives.xxx

²⁹ (Bourriaud, 1998: 103)

³⁰ (O'Sullivan, 2001: 127)

³¹ (Deleuze, 1981: 160)

XIX (Massumi, 1992: 77)

XX (Hejinian, 2000: 392)

XXI (http://www.eri.mmu.ac.uk/deleuze/on-deleuze-key_concepts.php)

³² <http://lito.klingt.org/writing/index.html>

*classically described as being outside of oneself, at the very point at which one is most intimately and unshareably in contact with oneself and one's vitality*³³. Placing

emphasis on its relational, two-way road aspect, it is here accounted for as a *sense of involvement*.

In one of her texts on social practice, Shannon Jackson waves thoughts on art that is embedded in its context(s): on its heteronomy (opposed to autonomy), its functionality, legibility and social incorporation (instead of antagonism). If we understand autonomy, as Bojana Cvejić suggests, emerging

*not from isolation or subversion but from the force of experimentation*³⁴, we can think of an art practice that is at the same time autonomous and

heteronomous. Maybe now more than ever, in this era of interdisciplinarity, collaboration and social experiments, art encompasses in its endeavors

elaborations of ways of evolving together — which brings us to a realm of ethics. In his *Theatre and Ethics*, Nicholas Ridout exposes how the question

how shall I act? becomes a matter of relation(s) and later he concludes that provoking a truly ethical response means demanding an issue for which one

does not know how to answer, a challenge from the place of the other — unsettling —, which might be an exact formulation of a possible *beyond logics of*

representation to the extent that it functions as a catalyst into not yet inhabited realms, the monstrosity of a movement of transformation returns. Art

itself can be seen, echoing the voice of Robert Filliou, as offering '*right of asylum*' to all deviant practices which cannot find their place in their natural bed³⁵ —

once exhausting the limits of other realms things become art. In how it settles the relation of art to other realms, this approach *per se* implies a specific

ethical value to art. Deleuze gives a definition of ethics that appeals to me: *not to be unworthy of what happens to us*³⁶. There starts a principle of acceptance.

Acceptance of that which might come about without having been announced, an exceeding presence that is monstrous. Here comes an universe of

wiktionary states
heteronomy: the state of
being beholden to
external influences

*the bond with others is only
made as responsibility,
Emmanuel Levinas XXX*

FLUXUS

encarta defines catalyst
as a stimulus to change:
somebody or
something that
makes a change happen
or brings about an event

³³ (Thrift, 2008:117)

³⁴ (Cvejić, 2005: 51)

³⁵ (Bourriaud, 1998: 102)

³⁶ (Deleuze, 1969: 149)

XXII (Bourriaud, 1998: 23)

differences at the same time that, in ethics disconnecting from moral precepts therefore becoming a matter of reflexivity, people might have to engage in (...)Understanding is for Schleiermacher primarily ethical: it does not derive final foundations from already existing rules, but rather imposes a continuing obligation upon free actors to attempt to see the world from the viewpoint of the other, and representing movement³⁷.

to articulate the potential created by the other, including oneself as other in self-reflexive interpretation. Andrew Bowie ^{XXIII} We have examined quite a number of approaches to logics of representation. I do indicate that Disch's exposing of the radical move in the understanding of representation goes in the direction I am searching for. For the moment, however, I will not get into further specifications of beyond which logics of

The infinite expansion of the field of possibility that resists all forms of totalizing closure. Jacques Rancière ^{XXIV} representation this research might be aiming at — I will look into examples of the field open to notice if and how they surpass the logics of aesthetic representation, as well as any logics of representation in a wider sense. Even if this take might share the Beckettian paradox, the impossibility of getting anywhere and yet going for it — the eventual impossibility of an actual move beyond logics of representation does not invalidate attempting it, a

suggestion is a great start, since in indescribable ways it might take place. If one takes that whatever way of describing is only one level of description and e.g. dance studio, a space for decanting in its being constructed as a neutral space like theater spaces not an absolute truth — as anything can be simultaneous or sequential depending on the perspective one assumes — the risk becomes to lose lucidity. Throughout this paper I will focus on examples of performance work that does not retreat in aseptic and isolated spaces reserved for representation — Massumi, writing about de-situated objects, concludes that then *the object no longer appears for and as itself but only for comparison*³⁸ — and that lives from

the field from which I look at the field: I unfold thinking in distinct ways, using a range of language strategies and elaborating thoughts at different lengths. The choice of a profusion of lines (references, hints or links that invite for further tracing specific directions, etc) is guided by the perception that thinking organizes itself as de-centered actions, nurtured by the indetermination of life in all its senses, as Antonin Artaud insisted — a de-centered thinking based on a widening (opening) attention rather than keeping a singular focus, which allows for an inclusion of multiple forces and potentially informs a state of *peripetia*. So, a desire to imply in the writing hints of embodiments — in the body of the text — of the matter that is being addressed plays a role. Writing is here an affirmation of the space that tends to abstraction not only as a framed condensation of events but as well as the inassimilable of the flow of life itself — in which, it seems to me, if the ongoing play of disorientation and re-orientation, monstrosity and recognition, ceases there is no sense any longer. Embodiment itself effects a performance that provides a range of possibilities for engaging with it. We are here far from a Newtonian understanding of time-space, from the *x* and *y* axes within which events happen, time-space constitutes itself in the particularity of each relation that arises, there are as many time-spaces as there are relations. The effort of *be(com)ing* in the world is implicated in embodiment, and that includes not only an ability to be in action but as well a sense of receptivity and vulnerability.

³⁷ (Olkowski, 1999: 132)

³⁸ (Massumi, 2002: 166)

and proposes a direct encounter *with*, in most extreme cases an invasion but mostly an intervention in the world outside the artistic niche. By appearing unexpectedly where it usually does not belong an enhanced confrontation occurs and generates movement. Ultimately, time-space are the all-permeating contexts from which one can not ever be detached. Works that are centered on their relation with (their) time-space, such as site-specific (and site-generic to a certain extent) works as well as those instances in which (our) time becomes a relevant material, will be prioritized here. Being grounded in or involved with one's context can go from the wider and most abstract sense of using (our) time as material, for instance, *zero grau*²⁹ by the Brazilian Nêlé Azevedo in which small ice puppets take their time slowly melting in the heat of the city, to a more direct sociopolitical engagement with the forces of our time. Degrees and types of political influence vary, to start grounding in concrete references I gather here some examples from around the globe that trace paths in this direction: Lia Rodrigues Companhia de Danças working in and integrating the slum Maré's population in Rio de Janeiro, the Colombian Red Juvenil doing performance interventions resisting military actions in Medellin, Espace Masolo in Congo making children soldiers into artists, Teatro Oficina in São Paulo incorporating the tough neighborhood of Bexiga in their performances, Francis Alys and the hundreds of people who moved a mountain slightly in Peru, Doran George being encased for a working day in a shopping mall or having sex in a box in a public place, *Membros cia de dança* by Paulo Azevedo and Tais Vieira in Macaé in Brazil, Rogerio Nuno Costa and the *Casa* projects, The Yes Men acting in the media, early Butoh performances in Japan, FLUXUS, Public Movement, William Pope L. crawling through America, The Situationists, Stelarc, Judson Theatre, Marina Abramovic's performances... this list could go on for long...

For audiences used to being fed simplistic representational formulas, "making sense" becomes a politically charged eruption of affective confusion.

M. R. Westmoreland ^{XXV}

XXIII (Bowie, 1990:)

XXIV (Rancière., 2000: 40)

³⁹ (São Paulo, 2007)

XXV (Westmoreland, 2008: 214)

Lefebvre tells us: *once separated from its context (...) the trivial becomes extraordinary, and the habitual becomes mythical*⁴⁰. This statement can function in both ways: out of the ordinary world displaced into a neutral space such as a black box any movement might gain the status Lefebvre refers to, as well as any codes or elements that have evolved in the extra-ordinariness of the context of performance placed back into the ordinary world might cause an estrangement. The blurring of logics in this encounter has a result probably predominantly informed by the logics of the wider context — performing on the streets during a military intervention, most likely little of aesthetic representation would survive this clash.

Some of these examples of work are tightly bound to one of the possible manifestations of excess: utopia (or maybe heterotopia as Rancière proposes), that (un)reachable point that creates enough space for meaningful moves to take place — there are occasions in which sense is only created by *inhabiting the edge of the abyss*⁴¹. These instances provide an opportunity to glimpse in the process of sense; sense does not exist as a constant. As one engages in negotiations with the moving context an ongoing assimilation of difference takes place — that exchange and confrontation informs back and forth one and the other, and so produces knowledge. Hejiniian suggests that knowledge is temporal, hence contextual, and that it lies between perception and thought: *Knowledge is a temporal faculty; a sense of time is intrinsic to it. And this sense of time, like language, functions as an aid to perception, as well as to anticipation*.⁴² Performance work that busies itself with a production of knowledge might find a good departure point in decrypting (our) time — room is generated for unperceived details to emerge, a renewed encounter with what is so close that might not have been noticed, or a thorough investment on that which, exactly due to the proximity, might have been assumed as already known; here is a conception of knowledge that finds its incipience within

There is always a pallakos, an abundance, in abandon: it opens on a profusion of possibilities, just as one abandons oneself in excess, for there is no other modality of abandon. Jean-Luc Nancy^{XXXI}

⁴⁰ (Lefebvre 1991: 13)

⁴¹ (Bourriaud, 1998: 54)

⁴² (Hejiniian, 2000: 223)

XXXVI (Nancy, 1993: 37)

the act of perception, in directly engaging with one's contexts, in the process of acknowledging the present, that is, within its circumstances of production. As any other experience, knowledge is a mutating instance.

Bringing the very agency of time to the forefront, durational performances are another example of an embodiment of excess and of working with (our) time as material. The text on PSI15's panel on *durational performance as cultural misfit* calls our attention to how that can function as a healthy break from our cultural time habits (nine to five routines) and so become an occasion for bodily reflection on existence — giving up for a while the clock time and diving in an experience of duration. Other ways to perceive and inhabit (our) time correspond to other body-mind states, differentiated wave frequencies — the overpowering time conditioning we are stuck in does not allow much room for *manoeuvre*; the dominating system(s) eat(s) one up pretty fast. Such strongly ingrained time frames occupying most perambulating embodiments soon render refusals of keeping tightly adjusted to current operative time regime(s) to the category of madness — since the experience of (our) time functions as a base for so many other layers of experience. It is with the remaining question of how to find escape routes and degrees of freedom that we are dealing here.

In its absent presence, as that which already exists but is not yet realized and that can manifest itself at any moment, *latency* is an interesting concept to think of now. The actor Rabih Mroué as well as other Lebanese artists are known for working with this concept — Joana Hadjithomas and Khalil Joreige define it as *necessity beyond evidence* —, I will here, however, take another route: looking into how it relates to the interventions The Yes Men perform around the world. The uniqueness of their work is often based on a paradox: however radical the idea of dressing up as spokesman of an important company and announcing big breakthrough news or publishing special newspaper editions proclaiming end of wars might seem, many of these extreme actions can only possibly actually take place because the facts announced were not only part of the field of the possible but were already present in one

(...) media objects in a latent state.
Representation revealed, not as the
mimetic image, but by the
materiality of its mediation, not as
photograph, but as a spool of latent
images. Trapping the magic of
mimesis in invisibility corresponds to
both the virtuality of digital
information and the corresponding
invisibility of undead subjectivity.
Westmoreland ^{xxxvii} on the work
of J. Hadjithomas and K. Joreige

way or another — as desire, facts wished for or counted on based on ethical impulses. In an elegant and affect-full fashion, they invest on latent potentials and turn spaces left blank or oddly made-up into an advantageous platform for the precision of their work. How they manage to trigger thousands of people into suddenly shifting direction has certainly to do with the sort of subjects they dedicate themselves to and the kinds of media they use but as well with the status the then revealed news previously enjoyed: were they not understood and/or felt as a *not yet realized necessity* for so many people it would probably not be followed by such intense impact. They sneak in strong representational systems to shake them from inside, causing them to leak — even if that kind of action does not actually provoke the effective and long lasting changes it plays out, it does touch on relevant matters to expose them anew. Starting at a critical distance to then get to play by the very same rules of the system to affect it, breaking in as an enabling strategy for breaking away — this is not about creating a reflection of reality, though it does stimulate reflection on reality. Only in its last turn, when the world figures out that someone stood in for someone else, the focus falls on presence — a (mis)taken, (dis)placed presence is the key of the tactical move. In another scale and set of references, the choreographer Felix Ruckert as well busies himself with presence and affect. His *Schwelle7* in Berlin is an unusual place that occasionally hosts some of his choreographies of intimacy, a theme which, in its dealing with warmth, trust and open expression of feeling, offers — as Richard Sennet tells us in *The Fall of Public Man* — psychological benefits we expect to permeate the range of our experience and which, when missing, as it so often does, renders social life stale. At this *threshold7* place, Ruckert works between dance, yoga and BDSM — on the website one reads: *experimental body work and body research, above all in the direction of play, magic and gentle madness*. It is a hybrid version of BDSM that inhabits the experimental context of *Schwelle7*, molded and informed by other practices surrounding it — to which I will refer here as *bds*m. This writing is informed mainly by experiences at that space and by the system Ruckert presents in his performance *On Pain and Presence*, which makes use of *bds*m to

present an understanding of how emotions and qualities of a (moving) body operate. One might wonder how concepts so far presented here relate to certain aspects of BDSM, such as the rigidity of dramatic role-playing or the black-and-whiteness of certain codes, that is, the strongly representational facets of it. At the same time, one can easily find a navigation between resonating terms: the intense and affective traits of any play, the opening of the body — similar to what *exhaustion work* generates — that potentially derives from it, the required ability to abandon oneself onto liminal experiences like the fluid processes of transformations of emotions such as deviations of pain and pleasure and the underlined movements between what Victor Turner called the *indicative* form of factuality and the *subjunctive* form of fiction. For instance, in the decision taken together of establishing a framed hierarchy is an offered entrance to a fictionalized realm that reveals other facets of belonging one-to-another as it allows experimenting with alternative ways of a shared existence.

The *bds*m universe simultaneously incorporated and created by Ruckert's work is a world of *switchers* and of unpredictability in which one busies oneself with tools that help to invent new relations 'to the body, to fantasy, to time passing, to the 'mysteries' of life and death'⁴³ — to use Guattari's words. Within the parameters *sane, safe and consensual*, plays happen in a fluidity of roles, dramatic leaves the main spot to become a ground for further developments. A concrete example of that one finds in the mixing of yoga and whipping or bondage, to which the description of Schwelle7's profile fit well: *The artistic principle is juxtaposition: the energy, which is released when heterogeneous elements are mixed together, without attempting to smooth out their differences.*

The big difference is about the intention. Most BDSM outside is mostly about fun and sexual pleasure. People just try to find out what works for themselves and their partner. It is about enhancing and deepening relationships. I would say 90% of SM outside happens private and individual, people that go to clubs are only a small percentage, and also the clubs are mostly just about socializing and mating. Or anonymous sex.

At schwelle there is a focus on public play, exchange and analysis. The way I guide my SM workshops are informed by ways of teaching Dance or other body techniques.

Contained tasks, exercises and reflection, structured improvisations and scores, working in the group and with different partners are core elements. BDSM as a way of experiencing the Self and individual emotional landscapes. Sexual pleasure is a side effect, but the most important is the experience itself, including and exploring the more scary or painful aspects. I try to encourage a more analytical research of the different ways of playing here, in order to understand better the effects of props and tools and dominant/submissive roles. So it is more about learning about and understanding the phenomena of the BDSM paradox (Bad is good and good is bad!!).

There is a focus on the theatrical and performative aspect and the aesthetics as well, just think of Yoga and Peitschen or Japanese Bondage, where it is really a lot about technique. Of course personal, individual meaning can not and should not be excluded, that is what the play parties are for, where individual pleasure and personal expression are encouraged. At the same time the quality of the playing there is obviously informed and influenced by the consciousness acquired in workshops here and the general sensitivity and intelligence that unites the people that gather around schwelle, as a side effect of the conscious approach here.

It is the same difference between a club or party, where you go to dance for fun and just enjoy, and a dance studio, where you dance in more structured ways, trying to understand and learn more about the possibilities of dance. Felix Ruckert ^{XXXVIII}

⁴³ (Bourriaud, 1998: 92)
 XXVII (Westmoreland, 2008: 252)
 XXXVIII (by email, 2010)

Juxtaposition as a formal operation of synchronicity. Secret connections, which suddenly become visible and then meaningful. Random collaborations and collages.

Grace, which arises from fragments playing together. Absurdity, irony, instability.

Rosalyn Deutsche shares with us her perception of public space not as location but as an operation. Ruckert's performances of intimacy happen mostly directly onto the body of the audience, that is, a private sphere becomes the platform for the public event of performance. In its turn, *On Pain and presence* is a performance-lecture by Lara Martelli and Felix Ruckert that keeps a little more distance to look into a system of seven layers: between pain and pleasure one finds presence, in the stretch between fear and trust attitude is born, between cholera and enthusiasm arises determination, between sadness and happiness is resonance, between shame and pride comes devotion, inferiority and superiority turn into humor and finally, control and loss of control form grace. Some people might question if pain, control or its loss actually can be considered emotions, however, so that we do not get lost in this discussion, I will take it as a good enough point that rather few people might reject the extremely close connection between those and emotional landscapes, and I will follow Ruckert's system. Here, I focus on pain and presence. Across a number of fields, there are long discussions on the question of one's ability to remember pain, to feel once again precisely how it was. In this paper, what matters is how pain awakens attention and triggers presence. It is amazing to notice how many kinds of pain there are and how they can transform into one another or, eventually, into the other end of the spectrum, pleasure. In the context of *On Pain and Presence* the focus is on sensing the skin through various stimuli and on an ability, since emotion is triggered in a process between two people, to be *with*. Widely diffuse or sharp, directional or multi-directional, pain makes one concentrate on the body, so that one is able to process what is taking place. It centers one in the now. It can function to bring one into a state of relaxation, it can be arousing or move one into a resisting mood. In any case, it dilates one's presence. Well, in the end, participation could not have been completely out of the deal for a

I do not know the answer
though I know from
experience that every time
I focus on remembering a
certain pain and then
experience the pain again, I
am surprised how faint the
image I had just then was.
Maybe it is a protective
mechanism.

choreographer who takes it to be a social exigency: one audience member spends quite a bit of time inside a box and the whole audience is invited for a relaxation exercise, at a certain moment of the evening — and a crowd exercise for two hands gets proposed at the very end.

Participation is the lens that invites one to approach and read embedded — and imbibed — in logics beyond the ones of representation. Usually some degree of participation is born from the kind of ambiguity proposed by work that situates itself between quotidian and art(ificial) life, between private and public realms. Participation implies at the minimum the role of witness, as opposed to a distanced, analytical and safe position, and at most a certain level

*A world is not a space nor a time; it is
the way we exist together.
Jean Luc Nancy xxx*

And invention is of intoxication. Works that vitally depend on participation for their activation suggest entering an area of ritualistic character. The economies of it are always born of *dissension* instability and potential dissent, as in dialogue.
Lyotard xxx

I understand participation as an extension of a collaborative *modus operandi* to the moment of performance, which includes an audience. Collaborative processes compels one to stay in the present and juggle with the impulses and the mo(ve)ments that emerge, it is the complexity of improvisation at work in a process that brings together the length of distinct backgrounds. In contrast with organizations that have as its base a vertical and hierarchical functioning, in which one single voice prevails throughout its processes — falling clearly into a representative mode: every other group component standing for that one pronounced desire —, within a pluri-nodal and therefore decentralized structure, such as a rhizomatic one, an idea of subtracting the leader establishes itself as every one assumes his or her own power to decide, to propose and to project. The tendency to a molecular functioning that, as Massumi elucidates in *A user's guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deviations from Deleuze and Guattari*, defines itself and gets differentiated from a molar one by its mode of composition and not by its size or scale, opens the potential for a politics of self-invention(s) — which does not always fit in an

O'Sullivan
writes about that in his book *Art Encounters*. Another way of describing it is the formula n-1: subtract from a given aggregate the element that totalizes it i.e. makes it homogeneous and overcodified.

molar: its working principle:
incorporate or annihilate xxx

ideology of efficient work, of occasions that exist in the restriction of getting straight through a plan towards an aim. Concrete examples of this particular kind of collaboration in performance practice might be found in the work of *Teatro da Vertigem* in São Paulo, the director Antonio Araujo writes from his experience with the actors: rehearsing is coordinating moods, it is going towards the other at the same than towards oneself, it is the antithesis of efficiency, an exercise of schizophrenia.

Thinking in terms of collective effort or effort collection — which minimizes a posture of waiting for — as well draws emphasis onto the co-causation of chance and choice or determinacy, as it gets acknowledged that power is spread among all a flow of unpredictable influences is immediately set up in a transparent way. This does not mean potentially preventing groups from possibly working as one and under someone's guidance, once either on a strong base of trust a *carte blanche* is given to someone by the group or else by working out together clear guidelines in advance, so that for instance intense processes that might need someone to play a role of trigger-observer could take place. As formulated above in the case of a *bds*m play, what sustains the whole is how the ground is shared — co-elaborations developing *in-between*.

This in-between-ness creates a sense of *transversality*, with lots of proportion and degree variation at stake — more power does entail more responsibility. Ultimately this is a kind of collaboration that does not function as a power game, in which competition would smash the working tendency to subtract the leader, the aim is opening a gap to fall into, a place that is an unknown field for all part(ie)s. Provided that there is in this case a notch less pressure in every person — who otherwise would have to carry the entire process alone at all times, always play strong and pull the whole project forward — there is more relaxation and yet an attentive and awoken presence which seems to be an appropriate environment for communication and

the breakaway into the unstable equilibrium of continuing self-invention^{xxxx} is what Deleuze and Guattari called schizophrenia.

Cvejc calls our attention to the fact that it is probably better to speak of *collection* instead of *collective* when it is a matter of *a number of working-with-one-another ones without an essence^{xxxxiii}*

there are currently in the field of performance (contemporary dance maybe in particular) loads of collectives emerging, gathering here and there – a manifestation of the idea of representation as activity, the idea of the crowd becoming (something they were not before) by coming together

exchange taking place. Following Novalis' statement that *one cannot produce revelations by force*⁴⁴, one could think these working premises are well susceptible for what could be seen as one of the tasks of contemporary art — from Katie Duck to Rogerio Nuno Costa passing by so many others, one hears the echo of principles of dealing with what is present, a simple *take and reveal it* assures the uniqueness of one's approach. Evidences in the work of the accumulation of approaches are manifestations of fluidity, that is, examples of fluidity in terms of the sensible. Surely two or more collaborators will not agree on every single aspect of the work, however what is created from this tension will be informed and might even, in the end, be aligned with all visions projected onto it. Hopefully, in disagreeing, people do not stop each other from doing things rather add to each other, which enhances the learning potential without which the value of collaboration (or of this particular kind I refer to) would be considerably diminished. Yes, the obvious thing, it does demand a certain degree of flexibility,

Pursuing this road, which implies an underlying pre-disposition for confrontations with chance — formed as well by others' empowered habits — can bring about a shake in one's *habits of subjectivity* — which could otherwise eventually tend to be circumscribed in absurdly simplified formulations — and an approach to new kinds of subjectivity, as one gets faced with the necessity to gain acquaintance with other ways of folding the world into one self. Suely Rolnik's words on contemporary subjectivity can help us here:

Today's subjectivities: grabbed from the soil, they have the gift of ubiquity – they fluctuate at the mercy of the mutable connections of desire with flows from all places and times that all pass simultaneously through electronic waves. A singular and fluid filter of this immense and also fluid ocean. With no name or

*It is precisely mobility which is
the essence of schema.
Gadamer XXXIV*

*Schelling and, in a more developed
manner Schleiermacher realize that
this ability to sustain identities is
linked to the ability to use a finite
vocabulary to talk
about a world which is infinitely
differentiated
Andrew Bowie XXXV*

*subjectivity is typically
a matter of excess.
Bryan Reynolds XXXVI*

⁴⁴ (Bowie, 1997: 79)

and

*permanent address, without identity: metamorphosing modulations in an endless process, tirelessly managed day after day.*⁴⁵

At the end of *Relational Aesthetics*, Bourriaud exposes some of Guattari's thoughts on subjectivity and, in it, the urgency to enact certain operations, such as to seize, enhance and reinvent⁴⁶ subjectivity as well as to untie the bonds that turn subjectivity into a natural attribute of the subject, which means *unsticking subjectivity from the subject*. Implied in this operation is a spilling of any mapping of subjectivity way beyond the limits of an individual — subjectivity gets defined only by the presence of (an)other. This set of ideas is aligned with writings by the performance theorist Bryan Reynolds, who makes the case for a subjectivity that transverses the subject, it is conceived as an emergent, shifting and mobile phenomenon. Reynolds relates transversality to excessive experience, in the sense of exceeding one's expectations; he affirms that this is the kind of experience that is *most likely to prompt subjunctivity, comings-to-be and transversal movements*⁴⁷. Once started off, transversal movements tend to be perpetuating and to keep differentiating from its catalyst(s). I find the concept of transversality introduced in *Transversal Subjects* particularly useful and interesting in its synthetic aspect: not thinking in terms of vertical and/or horizontal any longer. There is a suspicion, from Reynolds, that even though people occasionally fear and resist it or suffer as a result of the conditions under which it occurs, mostly people enjoy it. For him, *subjectivity always actively reconfigures away from the delimiting procedures and pressures of subjectivation, even if absolute or sustained emancipation never occurs*⁴⁸. He goes on, in slightly more concrete terms:

⁴⁵ (Rolnik, 1998: 1-2)

XXIX (Lyotard, 1979: xxv)

XXX (Nancy, 1993: 63)

XXXI (Massumi, 1992: 115)

⁴⁶ (Bourriaud, 1998: 89)

⁴⁷ (Reynolds, 2009: 34)

⁴⁸ (Reynolds, 2009: 2)

XXXII (Massumi, 1992: 92)

XXXIII (<http://www.tea-tron.com/quimbigas/blog/2009/12/08/collectivity-you-meant-collaboration-by-bojana-cvejic/>)

XXXIV (Bowie, 1997: 125)

Subjectivity supersedes its foundational conditions irreducibly when a person or group negotiates, inspires, or engages in transversal movements beyond the margins and parameters of subjective territories, whether their own or those of others. As a multidimensional product of the society in which a person develops, subjective territory is the conceptual, emotional, and physical scope through which a person experiences. Transversal movements drive subjectivities in directions alternative to those aligned with prescribed subjective territories. In effect, the parameters of subjective territories expand and reconfigure along with those of the official territories they comprise and of which they are essential constituents. Official territories are organized singular but interrelated commonalities (qualia, values, beliefs, etc.) that together make up a society and culture that both support and constrain the subjective territories that in turn encompass the society's infrastructure.⁴⁹

Further, he presents four paths for the emergence of subjectivity in its productive agential exercise, which happen, namely, through one's engaging with (1) *willful subjunctivity*, that is, practicing theorizing *as-ifs* and *what-ifs* of events, (2) *becomings-other*, or deliberately triggered transformations, (3) *negotiating and surmounting 'the proper'*, discovering maneuverability in detriment of stasis and reduction, and (4) *intentional transversality*, opposing to coherence by wandering, departing, metamorphosing outside of totalizing systems and conventions.

Rancière approaches the subject from his thinking around politics and aesthetics in a way that one can not be separated from the other, he speaks of *uncertain communities that call into question the distribution of roles, territories, and languages. In short, they contribute to the formation of political subjects that challenge the distribution of the sensible*⁵⁰. He sees a point where the activity of thought and sensible receptivity become a single reality and so constitute a sort of

(...) the dilution
of a presence and
a subjectivity
subservient to the
representational.
Andre Lepecki
xxxxiii

Becoming is supremely
pragmatic or it fails.
Massumi xxxviii

⁴⁹ (Reynolds, 2009: 2)
⁵⁰ (Rancière, 2000: 40)

*new region of being – the region of free play and appearance*⁵¹. That resonates with Cage's ideas, which encourage people to give up the desire to control sound. Urging an allowance for sounds to be themselves, he declares chaos, presence and togetherness welcome in an insight of a *multiplicity of centers in a state of non-obstruction and interpenetration*⁵². In a Guattarian view that would be the moment when *time stops being suffered, it is worked, oriented, as the object of qualificative changes* and there one finds oneself at ease with *creating mutant foci of subjectivation*⁵³.

Proposing a game with words, I would say it might be the case of re-naming subjectivity into *superjectivity* or *injectivity*; the subject as *subjected to* (that which lies under, under other things) does not quite any longer suit our purposes. Rather a *superject* (that which lies beyond, beyond its component elements), and in this exceeding oneself one becomes an injector. With *superjectivity* comes a sense of porosity; one could imagine happening to exist more in the between one's skin and the other's skin than under one's own skin — becoming essentially through transversal relation(s).

Rancière sees politics emerging exactly there, in a mode of subjectivity that speaks for itself in public realm. He delineates two kinds of politics: politics as police — maintaining order — and *political subjectivation* — a politics of disruption. The latter one is born at the point, when a subject *emerges and demands a role and a part to play in a reconfigured public sphere*⁵⁴. He refers to this emergent mode of subjectivity as a *part with no part* since it does not yet seem to find a properly defined place in society. *In order to be thought*, Rancière writes, *the real must be fictionalized*⁵⁵; not splitting thinking and feeling —

Massumi reminds us that *there is no thought that is not accompanied by a physical sensation of effort or agitation*⁵⁶ — and moving the emphasis a little to the

Watching Michael Moore's *Capitalism: a love story*, one concludes that fear is one of the biggest manipulation tools. And one of the most scary things — a thing anyone knows the least about, because there are uncountable forces operating to form it —, the ultimate monstrous, unpredictable and unrepresentable instance, is the future. These days, and since quite a long time, people have been ingeniously led to conduct their lives future-oriented.

Then it is what the whole (capitalist) system does in so many unsurmountable ways: you better plan it ahead. So what happens is that all decisions in life — and life itself — get caught in a time loop: far projecting into the future, all the way back here and the next step, and once more double check plans all the way far further into the future and so on; we are back to the very loop of re-presentation. So I wish to shift the emphasis somewhat towards experience and now, to the ethical decision of what to do now and to the exhaustion of now, which is to say, the potential of now, which is to say, the future is implied in the present. No need to go far, expanding in the moment (a deep breath) is a good start.

That means, a rooted exceeding presence in the moment, which has a sense of opening and unfolding out and forward.

(one of the possible definitions of freedom is the liberation of fear)

⁵¹ (Rancière, 2000: 27)

⁵² (Cage, 1961:36)

⁵³ (Bourriaud, 1998: 98)

XXXV (Bowie 1997: 59)

⁵⁴ Robert Porter, <http://www.variant.org.uk/30texts/Rancier.html>

⁵⁵ (Rancière, 2000: 38)

⁵⁶ (Massumi, 2002: 138)

latter one, I add that as well in order to be felt and made sense of. Fiction brings an excess with it, the notion of excess already implies, in itself, a *beyond* — a thing exceeding itself by its own force or by being affected by others open new territories; in other words, abandonment entails giving oneself over to something or someone (or to oneself) which will mean to be taken and therefore function according to other parameters, letting go of usual patterns.

Before we come to an end I will attempt summing up some of the main points exposed throughout this journey. First of all, looking into the idea of representation from a number of perspectives, I get particularly interested in that shift away from the traditional approaches to the concept (etymological, referential and conceiving of an *a priori*) and this emphasis on the difference of representation (as activity, articulation and de-centering) I consider a valid movement *beyond* its own logics. This way of thinking representation is rather unusual, would it be more of a current use of the term, I would have to reformulate my research question — and the word *beyond* would probably not be part of it. So, the sense of the question of how to step *beyond logics of representation* whirls on its identity grounds. From the discussion Rancièrè sets up I derive investments on three levels that might be useful approaches to my question: one's own presence, a relational aspect of negotiation and a welcoming of chance. A presence *articulated* out of its own entrails, born from a confrontation with a basic level of *necessity* — in the context of performance, in working through its latent, liminal and exhausted aspects, so that an enhanced presence emerges from it; it is a realm of sense(s) and sensation(s) and of one's (existential) time. The relational aspect of negotiation is a level of *articulation* with other people, that one kind of representation happening in one's *own name* — in the context of performance, collaborative and participatory moments that involve a dialogue, a potential of dissent, a give and take. A welcoming of chance as an openness in one's posture as working principle, an *articulation* with unknowns — in the context of performance, a grounding in one's context(s) and using time as material; an abandonment into (a) wider instance(s).

and

Hoping to have provided a glimpse on how potential paradoxes such as going simultaneously for the intensity of transformative endeavors like exhaustion and for a *be(com)ing with* can possibly function, I finish with Cage's words *Lets say Yes to our presence together in Chaos*⁵⁷ and, in a suggestion of a movement of closure that finds its way further, with Derrida's *because it has always already begun, representation therefore has no end. But one can conceive of the closure of that which is without end. Closure is that circular limit within which the repetition of difference infinitely repeats itself. That is to say, closure is its playing space. This movement is the movement of the world as play. (...) This play is cruelty as the unity of necessity and chance. (...) This play of life is artistic. To think the closure of representation is just to think the cruel powers of death and play, which permits presence to be born to itself and pleurably to consume itself through the representation in which it eludes itself in its deferral. To think the closure of representation is to think the tragic: not as the representation of fate, but as the fate of representation. Its gratuitous and baseless necessity. And it is to think why it is fatal that, in its closure, representation continues.*⁵⁸

⁵⁷ (Cage, 1961: 195)

⁵⁸ (Derrida, 1967: 316)

XXXVII (Lepecki, 2006: 85)

XXXVIII (Massumi, 1992: 100)

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